Digitizing the Schoolhouse Gate: Protecting Students’ Off-Campus Cyberspeech by Switching the Safety on Tinker’s Trigger by Rieger, Joshua
Florida Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 3 Article 5
October 2019
Digitizing the Schoolhouse Gate: Protecting
Students’ Off-Campus Cyberspeech by Switching
the Safety on Tinker’s Trigger
Joshua Rieger
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an
authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joshua Rieger, Digitizing the Schoolhouse Gate: Protecting Students’ Off-Campus Cyberspeech by Switching the Safety on Tinker’s Trigger, 70
Fla. L. Rev. 695 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss3/5
695 
DIGITIZING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PROTECTING 
STUDENTS’ OFF-CAMPUS CYBERSPEECH BY SWITCHING THE 
SAFETY ON TINKER’S TRIGGER  
Joshua Rieger* 
Abstract 
Secondary-school students regularly engage in cyberspeech both 
inside and outside the schoolhouse gate. Internet-era forms of 
communication allow these students to produce off-campus cyberspeech 
that can easily be accessed or brought onto campus by other students or 
faculty. As early as the 1990s, public-school administrations began 
punishing students for off-campus cyberspeech, accessed or brought onto 
campus, that the administrations deemed threatening, intimidating, 
harassing, or generally inappropriate for the school setting. Parents 
continue to challenge public-school administrations’ punishments of their 
children by filing civil suits in federal courts claiming these 
administrations violated their children’s First Amendment right to free 
speech. Whether parents’ challenges are successful usually turns upon 
whether the students’ off-campus speech causes, or can be reasonably 
forecasted to cause, a substantial disruption to school administration 
under Tinker’s substantial-disruption test. 
 This Note addresses the conflict that arises when public-school 
administrations punish students for off-campus cyberspeech, pitting a 
student’s right to free speech against a school’s duty to provide students 
a safe, nurturing environment. This Note discusses how federal circuit 
and district courts apply different standards for triggering Tinker’s test 
and explains why the holdings and dicta in Tinker and its progeny cases 
challenge the application of Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech 
cases. This Note offers a dual proposal that more accurately reflects the 
Court’s school-speech jurisprudence and better protects students’ right to 
free speech. First, federal circuit and district courts should decline to 
apply Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech cases. Tinker and its 
progeny support greater protections for off-campus speech. At minimum, 
lower federal courts should use a more stringent standard for triggering 
Tinker’s test. Second, if federal courts continue to apply Tinker’s test, 
then states should enact laws prohibiting school officials from punishing 
students for off-campus cyberspeech, except when that speech constitutes 
a true threat to the school community or is adjudicated as unlawful, as in 
cases of cyberbullying, harassment, or defamation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court has denied several petitions for 
writ of certiorari in First Amendment cases addressing whether public-
school administrations may punish public secondary-school students1 for 
their cyberspeech2 created outside the schoolhouse gate during non-
school hours.3 The most recent of these cases, Bell v. Itawamba County 
School Board,4 concerned the punishment of Taylor Bell, a high-school 
student from Mississippi.5  
During winter break of 2011, Bell produced a rap song and posted it 
from his personal computer to his Facebook account.6 In his rap, Bell 
                                                                                                                     
 1. This Note addresses cases concerning public-high-school and middle-school students. 
Cases concerning private-school students, public-elementary-school students, or private- and 
public-college students are outside the scope of this Note. 
 2. This Note defines cyberspeech as any form of speech produced over an internet or 
wireless connection, such as e-mailing, posting, blogging, texting, messaging, and other similar 
forms of communication (e.g., tweeting on Twitter or liking on Facebook). 
 3. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 1166 (2016); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 
652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011); Wisniewski v. 
Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 4. 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated en banc, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’g 859 
F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Miss. 2012).   
 5. Id. at 282. 
 6. Id. at 285. The Fifth Circuit en banc described Bell’s rap as “incredibly profane and 
vulgar” and published Bell’s lyrics as follows:  
Let me tell you a little story about these Itawamba coaches / dirty ass niggas like 
some fucking coacha roaches / started fucking with the white and know they 
fucking with the blacks / that pussy ass nigga W[.] got me turned up the fucking 
max / Fucking with the students and he just had a baby / ever since I met that 
cracker I knew that he was crazy / always talking shit cause he know I’m from 
daw-city / the reason he fucking around cause his wife ain’t got no tidies / This 
niggha telling students that they sexy, betta watch your back / I’m a serve this 
nigga, like I serve the junkies with some crack / Quit the damn basketball team / 
the coach a pervert / can’t stand the truth so to you these lyrics going to hurt 
What the hell was they thinking when they hired Mr. R[.] / dreadlock Bobby Hill 
the second / He the same see / Talking about you could have went pro to the NFL 
/ Now you just another pervert coach, fat as hell / Talking about you gangsta / 
drive your mama’s PT Cruiser / Run up on T–Bizzle / I’m going to hit you with 
my rueger Think you got some game / cuz you fucking with some juveniles / you 
know this shit the truth so don’t you try to hide it now / Rubbing on the black 
girls ears in the gym / white hoes, change your voice when you talk to them / I’m 
a dope runner, spot a junkie a mile away / came to football practice high / 
remember that day / I do / to me you a fool / 30 years old fucking with students 
at the school Hahahah / You’s a lame / and it’s a dam shame / instead you was 
lame / eat shit, the whole school got a ring mutherfucker Heard you textin number 
25 / you want to get it on / white dude, guess you got a thing for them yellow 
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alleged Michael Wildmon and Chris Rainey—athletic coaches at Bell’s 
high school—sexually harassed female students.7 A few days after Bell’s 
posting, news of Bell’s rap reached Wildmon during school hours.8 
Because school computers blocked Facebook and Bell’s rap was only 
accessible by his Facebook friends, the only way Wildmon could access 
Bell’s rap was through a student’s cell phone with access to Bell’s 
Facebook page.9 A student with access to Bell’s Facebook page provided 
Wildmon a cell phone to view Bell’s rap, in violation of the school’s 
regulation prohibiting students from bringing cell phones to school, and 
Wildmon immediately informed the principal of the rap.10  
The school administration sent Bell home that day (a Friday) and due 
to heavy snowfall, Bell’s school remained closed until the following 
Friday.11 During this period when school was closed, Bell created another 
version of his rap and posted this newer version from his personal 
computer to YouTube before classes resumed.12 When classes did 
resume, the school administration removed Bell from class and 
suspended him until a disciplinary committee hearing could be held.13 
After the disciplinary committee hearing, both the disciplinary committee 
and the school board concluded some of Bell’s lyrics “threatened, 
intimidated, and/or harassed” the teachers, in violation of school-board 
policy and Mississippi law.14 The disciplinary committee upheld Bell’s 
seven-day suspension, required Bell to transfer to an alternative school 
for the remainder of the nine-week grading period, and prohibited Bell 
from attending school functions.15  
                                                                                                                     
bones / looking down girls shirts / drool running down your mouth / you fucking 
with the wrong one / going to get a pistol down your mouth / Boww OMG / Took 
some girls in the locker room in PE / Cut off the lights / you motherfucking freak 
/ Fucking with the youngins / because your pimpin game weak / How he get the 
head coach / I don’t really fucking know / But I still got a lot of love for my nigga 
Joe / And my nigga Makaveli / and my nigga codie / W[.] talk shit bitch don’t 
even know me Middle fingers up if you hate that nigga / Middle fingers up if you 
can’t stand that nigga / middle fingers up if you want to cap that nigga / middle 
fingers up / he get no mercy nigga.  
Bell, 799 F.3d at 384 (alteration in original). 
 7. Bell, 774 F.3d at 283. 
 8. Id. at 285 (“Wildmon received a text message inquiring about the song from his wife, 
who had been informed of Bell’s Facebook posting by a friend.”). 
 9. Id. at 285–86. 
 10. Id. at 286, 288. 
 11. Id. at 286. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 287–89. 
 15. Id. 
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Bell’s mother brought a civil claim before a federal district court, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,16 alleging the school administrators 
violated her son’s First Amendment right to free speech17 by punishing 
him for his off-campus cyberspeech.18 The district court ruled in the 
school’s favor on cross-motions for summary judgment, finding the 
school officials acted reasonably under the Supreme Court’s Tinker v. 
Des Moines School District19 substantial-disruption test (hereinafter, 
Tinker’s test) and “did not err in punishing Bell for publishing [the rap] 
to the public.”20  
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Bell 
nearly prevailed on his First Amendment claim.21 A Fifth Circuit panel 
reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the school 
board and declined to determine whether Tinker’s test is applicable to off-
campus cyberspeech.22 Even if Tinker’s test were applicable to Bell’s 
case, the Fifth Circuit panel concluded that “the evidence [did] not 
support a finding . . . that Bell’s song either substantially disrupted the 
school’s work or discipline or that the school officials reasonably could 
have forecasted such a disruption.”23 Further, the rap neither “gravely or 
uniquely threaten[ed] violence” to the school community, nor constituted 
a “true threat” to the teachers’ safety.24  
The Fifth Circuit en banc reconsidered Bell’s case, vacated its panel’s 
earlier opinion, and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in 
favor of the school board.25 Judge Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale, who 
dissented in the Fifth Circuit’s panel opinion and characterized its holding 
                                                                                                                     
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . .”). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 18. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (N.D. Miss. 2012). 
 19. Id. at 840–41; see 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (“[C]onduct by the student, in class or out 
of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, 
not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”). For a discussion of 
Tinker’s substantial-disruption test, see infra Section I.A. 
 20. Bell, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 840. 
 21. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 289, 304 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated en 
banc, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’g 859 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Miss. 2012).  
 22. Id. at 304. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Bell, 799 F.3d at 383. 
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as “absurd,”26 authored the Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion.27 Judge 
Barksdale narrowly concluded Tinker’s test is applicable to off-campus 
cyberspeech “when a student intentionally directs at the school 
community speech reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, 
harass, and intimidate a teacher, even when such speech originated, and 
was disseminated, off-campus without the use of school resources.”28 
Judge Barksdale also declined to adopt “any rigid standard [for when 
Tinker’s test should and should not apply]” or “adopt or reject approaches 
advocated by other circuits.”29  
Because “a substantial disruption reasonably could have been forecast 
as a matter of law” by the school administration due to Bell’s 
“threatening, intimidating, and harassing language” towards teachers,30 
the Fifth Circuit en banc reasoned Bell’s speech was not constitutionally 
protected under Tinker’s test.31 Therefore, it was unnecessary to 
determine whether Bell’s speech constituted a true threat.32 The Fifth 
Circuit en banc held the school correctly punished Bell and did not violate 
his First Amendment rights.33 Four judges dissented to the Fifth Circuit’s 
en banc opinion,34 and Judge James L. Dennis, who authored the Fifth 
Circuit’s vacated panel opinion, criticized “the majority opinion [for] 
allow[ing] schools to police their students’ Internet expression anytime 
and anywhere—an unprecedented and unnecessary intrusion on students’ 
rights.”35  
Bell filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, but 
the Court denied the petition.36 With the Supreme Court denying 
certiorari in Bell’s case and all other off-campus cyberspeech cases,37 the 
Court continues to deprive federal circuit and district courts of guidance 
on whether Tinker’s test should apply to off-campus cyberspeech cases—
and if so, the appropriate standard for triggering Tinker’s test.38  
                                                                                                                     
 26. Bell, 744 F.3d at 307 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). 
 27. Bell, 799 F.3d at 383. 
 28. Id. at 396.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 398.  
 31. Id. at 400. 
 32. Id. True threats are not protected under the First Amendment. See Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding threats against President’s life were not true threats). 
 33. Bell, 799 F.3d at 398, 400. 
 34. Id. at 403, 433, 435. 
 35. Id. at 405 (Dennis, J., dissenting). For additional coverage of the Bell case, including 
concurrences and dissents to the Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion, see Elizabeth A. Shaver, Denying 
Certiorari in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1539, 1571–80 (2017). 
 36. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). 
 37. See cases cited supra note 3. 
 38. See, e.g., J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1102–03 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“The Supreme Court has yet to address the factual situation presented 
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This Note addresses various conflicts that arise when public-school 
administrations punish students for off-campus cyberspeech, pitting a 
student’s right to free speech against a school’s duty to provide students 
a safe, nurturing environment. Bell’s case offers a useful window into 
many of these conflicts. First, should federal courts apply Tinker’s test to 
off-campus cyberspeech cases? If so, what standard should federal courts 
utilize to trigger Tinker’s test? Second, if a federal court does not apply 
Tinker’s test, or Tinker’s test is not satisfied, what types of cyberspeech 
still lack First Amendment protection? Third, what are the competing 
arguments for allowing school administrations to punish students for off-
campus cyberspeech that satisfies Tinker’s test, or prohibiting these 
administrations from doing so? Fourth, are there alternatives to 
punishment by school administrations? Lastly, there is a question that has 
not received great attention from legal scholarship: How can state law 
affect off-campus cyberspeech cases? This Note addresses these 
questions and related concerns as follows: 
Part I examines the federal case law currently controlling off-campus 
cyberspeech cases. Part I analyzes how Tinker and its progeny cases 
support greater First Amendment protections for students’ off-campus 
speech than on-campus speech and further details how federal circuit and 
district courts have established different standards for triggering Tinker’s 
test.  
Part II examines the relatively sparse state case law affecting off-
campus cyberspeech cases, as well as federal case law considering how 
state law (e.g., constitutions, statutes, and regulations) could impact the 
federal cases.  
Part III addresses whether courts’ and school officials’ concern for 
protecting the school environment serves as an adequate justification for 
allowing school administrations to punish students for their off-campus 
cyberspeech. Part III also questions to what extent other governmental or 
private causes of action, such as cyberbullying, harassment, and 
defamation, may be better suited to meet public policy goals and First 
Amendment principles than school administrative punishment. 
Part IV presents a dual proposal for new federal and state approaches 
to address students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases. First, this Note 
proposes lower federal courts engage in location-determinative analysis, 
recognizing a distinction between on-campus and off-campus 
cyberspeech. The lower federal courts can reject the application of 
Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech cases. More realistically, if lower 
federal courts continue applying Tinker’s test, the lower federal courts 
can adopt a more stringent standard for triggering Tinker’s test. Both 
                                                                                                                     
by the case at hand—that is, whether a school can regulate student speech or expression that 
occurs outside the school gates, and is not connected to a school-sponsored event, but that 
subsequently makes its way onto campus, either by the speaker or by other means.”). 
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options are supported by the holdings and dicta in Tinker and its progeny 
supporting the proposition that students’ off-campus speech is entitled to 
greater free-speech protection than students’ on-campus speech. 
However, lower federal courts will probably continue along the current 
path. 
Second, this Note proposes that states enact laws designed to expand 
students’ right to free speech in the off-campus cyberspeech context 
beyond what is recognized by the lower federal courts’ interpretations of 
the Court’s school-speech jurisprudence. With such a law in place, a 
parent could more easily file a civil suit in state court rather than the less 
favorable federal court system. 
I.  FEDERAL APPROACH TO OFF-CAMPUS CYBERSPEECH  
In the 1969 landmark opinion of Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas declared, “It can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”39 Justice Fortas’s primary 
concern was students not losing their constitutional rights to free speech 
when entering through the schoolhouse gate, not exiting from it.40 In three 
student-speech cases that followed, the Court carved exceptions to this 
declaration, noting when student speech loses its protections inside the 
schoolhouse gate.41 Although neither Tinker nor its progeny established 
what test or standard should be applied to off-campus student-speech 
cases, Tinker and its progeny offered dicta that the student speech at issue, 
though not protected on-campus, would have been protected off-campus 
under the First Amendment.42  
In off-campus cyberspeech cases arising since the late 1990s, federal 
circuit and district courts have concluded Tinker and its progeny permit 
school administrations to punish students for off-campus cyberspeech 
that satisfies Tinker’s test.43 However, the lower federal courts have 
crafted different standards for triggering Tinker’s test.  
Section I.A examines the Supreme Court’s four landmark cases 
concerning student speech and the Court’s silence as to whether Tinker’s 
test is applicable to off-campus student-speech cases. Section I.B 
discusses the circuit courts’ creativity in applying Tinker’s test to off-
campus cyberspeech cases, despite the Court’s silence. Section I.C 
                                                                                                                     
 39. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 42. See infra Subsection I.A.2. 
 43. See Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177–
80 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
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discusses how district courts that lack a binding circuit decision are then 
persuaded to adopt one or another of the circuits’ different standards for 
triggering Tinker’s test. 
A.  U.S. Supreme Court’s Silence on Off-Campus Cyberspeech 
From 1969 to 2007, the Supreme Court decided four landmark cases 
concerning on-campus student speech.44 But the Court remains 
deafeningly silent on cases addressing students’ off-campus 
cyberspeech,45 and off-campus student speech in general. The practical 
effect is federal circuit and district courts will likely continue to broadly 
interpret and apply Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech cases. 
1.  Tinker v. Des Moines School District 
In December 1969, two high-school students and one middle-school 
student from Des Moines, Iowa, crafted a plan to wear black armbands to 
school in protest of the Vietnam War.46 The students’ principals learned 
of the plan and adopted a policy restricting students from wearing 
armbands.47 When the students refused to remove their armbands at 
school, the principals suspended the students until they decided to return 
to school without the armbands.48 The students’ fathers filed a complaint 
with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa asking for 
an injunction prohibiting the school from punishing the students.49 The 
district court ruled in the school’s favor, and a divided U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit en banc affirmed the district court’s 
decision without an opinion.50  
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and 
remanded, opining “First Amendment rights, applied in light of the 
special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers 
and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”51 To protect students’ First Amendment right to free 
speech, the Court adopted a substantial-disruption test, that is, Tinker’s 
test. To permissibly regulate student’s “pure speech,”52 a school must 
provide evidence “showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See infra Subsections I.A.1–I.A.2. 
 45. See cases cited supra note 3. 
 46. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 47. Id. at 504. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 504–05. 
 51. Id. at 506, 514. 
 52. Id. at 508. 
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‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’”53 The Court 
concluded the schools presented no evidence that the armbands caused, 
or could reasonably be foreseen to cause, a substantial disruption.54 
Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black dissented to this decision, 
proclaiming that “[s]chool discipline . . . is an integral and important part 
of training our children to be good citizens—to be better citizens. . . . This 
case . . . subjects all the public schools in the country to the whims and 
caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, 
students.”55 
Where the Court unwittingly set the stage for controversy concerning 
off-campus student-speech cases was its discussion of where, when, and 
how student speech loses its First Amendment immunization.56 The 
Court stated its ruling would not be “confined to the supervised and 
ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom” or “embrace 
merely the classroom hours.”57 The Court specifically qualified that this 
statement applies to students’ right to free speech in places like cafeterias, 
playing fields, or the general school campus.58 Although the Court 
appeared to restrict its holding to on-campus student speech, the Court 
later articulated and arguably expanded upon Tinker’s test, opening the 
door for lower federal courts looking to apply Tinker’s test to off-campus 
student-speech:  
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any 
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of 
behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of 
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of speech.59 
In Tinker’s progeny cases, the Court considers whether Tinker’s test 
is applicable to on-campus student speech, and each case presents an 
example of when the Court finds a school has an important interest in 
light of its “special characteristics”60 outweighing a student’s First 
Amendment right to free speech.61 Notably, in each of Tinker’s progeny 
cases, the Court explicitly stated in dicta that the unprotected on-campus 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). 
 54. Id. at 509–10. 
 55. Id. at 524–25 (Black, J., concurring). 
 56. See id. at 512–13 (majority opinion). 
 57. Id. at 512. 
 58. Id. at 512–13. 
 59. Id. at 513. 
 60. Id. at 506. 
 61. See infra Subsection I.A.2. 
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student speech at issue would have been protected under the First 
Amendment had the speech been made off campus.62  
2.  Tinker’s Progeny Support Location-Determinative Analysis 
The Supreme Court considered three student-speech cases after its 
decision in Tinker, each carving an exception to students’ right to free 
speech on campus: Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser,63 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,64 and Morse v. Frederick.65 The 
Fraser Court affirmed the school punishment of a student for vulgar 
language during a speech at a school assembly.66 The Hazelwood Court 
affirmed the school censorship of two stories in a school-sponsored 
newspaper concerning a student’s pregnancy and the divorce of a 
student’s parents.67 The Morse Court affirmed the school’s punishment 
of a student who unfurled a banner at a school-sponsored event that read, 
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”68 While the Court ruled the student’s speech 
was not protected under the First Amendment in each of these cases, the 
Court opined that had the same speech in these cases been made off 
campus, it would have been protected under the First Amendment.69 
These conclusions by the Court support the contention that the location 
of student speech (for example, on-campus versus off-campus) is a 
relevant factor when determining the degree to which student-speech is 
protected under the First Amendment (the “location-determinative 
analysis”). Therefore, there is a strong argument to be made that location-
determinative analysis should be applied when determining whether 
Tinker’s test is applicable to off-campus student-speech cases, including 
those involving cyberspeech. 
a.  Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
Fraser arose in April 1983 when—at a school assembly of roughly 
600 students—one student gave a speech nominating another student for 
an elected position.70 The Fraser Court described the student’s speech as 
an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor”71 and upheld the 
                                                                                                                     
 62. See infra Subsection I.A.2. 
 63. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 64. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 65. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 66. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
 67. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–74. 
 68. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
 69. See infra Subsections I.A.2.a, A.2.b, A.2.c.  
 70. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677. 
 71. Id. at 677–78. The student’s speech read:  
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school administration’s three-day suspension of the student for a 
violation of the school’s regulation prohibiting obscene language.72 To 
rationalize why the student’s nomination speech was not afforded the 
protections granted by Tinker, the Fraser Court looked to the school’s 
interest in educating students to become good citizens73 and society’s 
interest in protecting minors from inappropriate language.74 The Court 
concluded “it is a highly appropriate function of public school education 
to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. . . . 
The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school 
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”75 The 
majority explicitly qualified the school board’s authority to regulate 
student speech “in the classroom or in the school assembly,” denoting a 
limit to where the school board’s authority exists.76 Nevertheless, because 
the student produced a provocative speech at a school assembly, the Court 
held that the school did not violate the student’s First Amendment right 
to free speech.77 
In a concurring opinion, Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, 
Jr. specifically addressed the breadth of Fraser’s holding.78 Justice 
Brennan reasoned, “If [the student] had given the same speech outside of 
the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply because 
government officials considered his language to be inappropriate; the 
Court’s opinion does not suggest otherwise.”79 Although Justice 
                                                                                                                     
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his 
character is firm—but most of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel is firm. 
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll 
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives 
hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds.  
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and 
every one of you.  
So vote for Jeff for ASB vice-president—he’ll never come between you and 
the best our high school can be. 
Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 72. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678, 685. The school rule provided, “Conduct which materially and 
substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, 
profane language or gestures.” Id. at 678. This rule’s language clearly tracks the language of 
Tinker’s substantial-disruption test. 
 73. Id. at 683. 
 74. Id. at 684–85. 
 75. Id. at 683.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 685. 
 78. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 79. Id. (citations omitted). 
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Brennan’s logic is merely persuasive, it provides support for the 
contention that location-determinative analysis is warranted in 
determining whether Tinker’s test is applicable to off-campus student-
speech cases.  
b.  Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier  
Hazelwood arose in May 1983 when a high-school journalism class 
submitted to the principal page proofs for the school’s newspaper.80 The 
principal censored two stories—one related to a student’s pregnancy and 
another related to the divorce of a student’s parents.81 The newspaper 
went to print without those two stories, and the parents of three student 
journalists filed an action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri claiming the school violated the students’ 
First Amendment right to free speech.82 The Supreme Court ultimately 
held this on-campus student-speech was not protected under the First 
Amendment.83  
The Hazelwood Court began its analysis looking to Tinker and Fraser, 
affirming the special characteristics of the school environment and that 
students’ rights are not co-extensive with those of adults.84 The 
Hazelwood Court distinguished the question in Tinker—“whether the 
First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student 
speech”—from the instant question—“whether the First Amendment 
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”85 
Finding the key difference to be that the speech in Tinker did not bear the 
“imprimatur of the school,” whereas a school newspaper created through 
the school’s journalism curriculum does bear a school’s imprimatur,86 the 
Hazelwood Court held that “educators do not offend the First Amendment 
by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions 
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”87 
Importantly, in dicta, the Hazelwood Court interpreted Fraser to hold 
that “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with 
its ‘basic educational mission,’ even though the government could not 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 263–64. 
 83. Id. at 272–73. 
 84. Id. at 266. 
 85. Id. at 270–71. 
 86. Id. at 271. 
 87. Id. at 273. 
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censor similar speech outside the school.”88 Again, the Court clearly 
provides support for the contention that location-determinative analysis 
is warranted in determining whether Tinker’s test is applicable to off-
campus student-speech cases.  
c.  Morse v. Frederick 
Morse arose in January 2002 when an Alaskan high school held an 
event to allow students to watch the Olympic Torch Relay.89 Students 
were permitted to stand along the sidewalk in front of the high school or 
the sidewalk across from the high school as the relay passed by.90 A group 
of high-school students standing on the sidewalk across from the high 
school “unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase: ‘BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS.’”91 When the principal demanded the students take down the 
banner, all students complied but one.92 The incompliant student received 
a ten-day suspension because the principal believed the banner violated 
the school policy prohibiting the advocation of illegal-drug use.93 The 
Supreme Court held the student did not have a First Amendment right to 
unfurl his banner.94  
Similar to the Fraser and Hazelwood Courts, the Morse Court 
acknowledged the school environment’s special characteristics and the 
fact that students’ rights are not co-extensive with those of adults.95 The 
Morse Court reasoned “[t]he ‘special characteristics of the school 
environment,’ and the governmental interest in stopping student drug 
abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably 
regard as promoting illegal drug use.”96 Thus, the Morse Court held the 
school could permissibly “restrict student speech at a school event, when 
that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”97 
Reasoning that student speech at school events falls within the 
purview of on-campus student speech, the Morse Court avoided the 
uncomfortable task of addressing what standards or tests govern off-
campus student speech. Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea argued that the 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)) 
(emphasis added). 
 89. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 398. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 400. 
 95. Id. at 396–97 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)). 
 96. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969)). 
 97. Id. at 403. 
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Morse Court missed a glaring opportunity to provide much-needed 
guidance in off-campus student-speech cases.98 Nevertheless, the Morse 
Court—like the Hazelwood Court—acknowledged in dicta how Fraser’s 
holding supports a distinction between on- and off-campus student 
speech,99 providing support for the contention that location-determinative 
analysis is warranted in determining whether Tinker’s test is applicable 
to off-campus student-speech cases. 
3.  Effect of Denying Certiorari 
Following the Morse decision, the Supreme Court received several 
petitions for writ of certiorari in off-campus cyberspeech cases.100 By 
denying these petitions, the Court leaves the lower federal courts without 
guidance on what test or standard should be applied to off-campus 
cyberspeech cases. Perhaps the Court’s silence shows an implicit 
approval of how the lower federal courts have handled these cases. 
Perhaps the Court’s silence underscores a hesitancy to fashion a test or 
standard that may cause more issues than it solves as students’ use of 
cyberspeech continues to evolve. One can only guess why the Court 
denied each petition for writ of certiorari in off-campus cyberspeech 
cases since 2008. The only outcome of the Court’s silence that appears 
certain is lower federal courts will continue to support the application of 
Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech cases. 
B.  Circuit Courts’ Creativity in Triggering Tinker 
While circuit courts uniformly hold Tinker’s test is applicable to off-
campus cyberspeech cases, the circuit courts split on the standard for 
when Tinker’s test should be triggered.101 Some circuit courts adopt a 
broad reasonable-foreseeability standard.102 Other circuit courts adopt 
seemingly narrower standards, such as the Fifth Circuit’s intent-based 
standard outlined in Bell.103 In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit assumed, without deciding, Tinker’s test applied 
because the school administration could not prove the student’s off-
campus cyberspeech caused a substantial disruption at school.104  
                                                                                                                     
 98. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 
1028 (2008) (“[In Morse], the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to determine whether public 
schools have authority to restrict student speech that occurs off school grounds.”). 
 99. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (“Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum 
outside the school context, it would have been protected.”). 
 100. See cases cited supra note 3.  
 101. See infra Subsection I.B.1. 
 102. See infra Subsection I.B.1.a.  
 103. See infra Subsection I.B.1.b. 
 104. See infra Subsection I.B.1.c. 
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Circuit courts are clearly conflicted and bereft of guidance on what 
standard is appropriate to trigger Tinker’s test in off-campus cyberspeech 
cases, and arguably, whether Tinker’s test should be applied in the first 
place. Two opinions—one concurrence and one dissent—from the Third 
Circuit case, J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District,105 
provide a useful window into the arguments underpinning this issue.106  
1.  Circuit Courts’ Different Standards for Triggering Tinker 
Circuit courts have established different standards for triggering 
Tinker’s test in off-campus cyberspeech cases. At one end of the 
spectrum, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits 
apply a broad reasonable-foreseeability standard.107 At the other end, the 
Third Circuit assumed, without deciding, Tinker’s test is applicable to 
off-campus cyberspeech cases.108 Between these poles, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit fashioned a nexus-based standard, similar 
to the reasonable-foreseeability standard.109 The Fifth Circuit imposed an 
intent-based standard that is facially narrow but broad in its 
application.110 Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
tailored a true-threat-based standard for a case involving particularly 
threatening cyberspeech, but this standard and true threats will be 
discussed more fully in Subsection III.A.1.111 The circuit courts’ lack of 
coherence on what standard should trigger the application of Tinker’s test 
stems from the circuits stretching the holdings and dicta of Tinker and its 
progeny cases to capture students’ off-campus cyberspeech.112 This lack 
of coherence and stretching is particularly troubling in off-campus 
                                                                                                                     
 105. 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 106. See infra Subsection I.B.2. 
 107. See infra Subsection I.B.1.a. 
 108. See infra Subsection I.B.1.c. 
 109. See infra Subsection I.B.1.b. 
 110. See infra Subsection I.B.1.b. 
 111. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen faced 
with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to 
off-campus speech that meets the requirements of Tinker.”). 
 112. See id. (“One of the difficulties with the student speech cases is an effort to divine and 
impose a global standard for a myriad of circumstances involving off-campus speech. . . . [W]e 
are reluctant to try and craft a one-size fits all approach. We do not need to consider at this time 
whether Tinker applies to all off-campus speech . . . .”); Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 
379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Further, in holding Tinker applies to the off-campus speech in this 
instance, because such determinations are heavily influenced by the facts in each matter, we 
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cyberspeech cases because application of Tinker’s test has been outcome-
determinative.113  
a.  Second and Eighth Circuits  
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education114 and Doninger v. Niehoff,115 
the Second Circuit concluded Tinker’s test applies to off-campus 
cyberspeech that “poses a reasonably foreseeable risk that [it] would 
come to the attention of school authorities.”116 The Eighth Circuit, in 
D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District # 60117 and S.J.W. ex rel. 
Wilson v. Lee’s Summit School District,118 adopted the Second Circuit’s 
reasonable-foreseeability standard.119 In adopting a reasonable-
foreseeability standard, the Second and Eighth Circuits are the circuits 
most likely to permit application of Tinker’s test in off-campus 
cyberspeech cases.  
Of all forms of off-campus student speech, off-campus cyberspeech is 
most at risk of coming to the attention of a school official. For example, 
the cyberspeech at issue in Wisniewski, Doninger, D.J.M., and S.J.W. 
were online instant messages,120 blog posts,121 and content on a student-
created website.122 Anyone with access to these and other forms of 
student cyberspeech can reproduce it in a matter of seconds at any 
location with Wi-Fi or cellular service. Thus, it is reasonably foreseeable 
that nearly all off-campus cyberspeech could make its way inside the 
schoolhouse gate and before a school official’s desk.123 
  
                                                                                                                     
 113. See, e.g., S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 
2012) (“The [students’] success on the merits will depend on what standard the District Court 
applies. The School District argues [Tinker] should control. The [students] argue otherwise.”). 
 114. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 115. 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 116. See id. at 347; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38. 
 117. 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 118. 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 119. Id. at 778 (“Just like the online speech in . . . Doninger, the NorthPress posts ‘could 
reasonably be expected to reach the school . . . .’”); Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 766 (“Here it was 
reasonably foreseeable that D.J.M.’s threats about shooting specific students in school would be 
brought to the attention of school authorities . . . .”).  
 120. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 757; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35.  
 121. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 340–41. 
 122. Lee’s Summit, 696 F.3d at 773. 
 123. In his concurrence to Blue Mountain, Judge Smith reasoned, “A bare foreseeability 
standard could be stretched too far, and would risk ensnaring any off-campus expression that 
happened to discuss school-related matters.” J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 
F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring). 
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b.  Fourth and Fifth Circuits  
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits adopted what appear facially to be more 
stringent standards for triggering Tinker’s test. In Kowalski v. Berkeley 
County Schools,124 the Fourth Circuit put forth a nexus-based standard 
considering whether there is a “sufficiently strong” nexus between the 
student’s cyberspeech and the school’s “pedagogical interests” to “justify 
the action taken by school officials in carrying out their role as the trustees 
of the student body’s well-being.”125 One scholar argues that the Fourth 
Circuit actually adopted a reasonable-foreseeability standard, like the 
Second and Eighth Circuits.126 Whether the Fourth Circuit adopted a 
nexus-based or reasonable-foreseeability standard is ultimately a 
distinction without a difference, as is discussed below.  
In Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, the Fifth Circuit fashioned 
an intent-based standard considering whether “a student intentionally 
directs at the school community speech reasonably understood by school 
officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher, even when such 
speech originated, and was disseminated, off-campus without the use of 
school resources.”127 Although these standards appear narrower than the 
reasonable-foreseeability standard for triggering Tinker’s test, the 
nebulous wording of these two standards allow judges leeway in 
determining what “sufficient nexus” and “intentionally directs at the 
school community” mean.  
In Kowalski, the Fourth Circuit concluded a student’s webpage 
entitled “Students Against Sluts Herpes” satisfied the nexus-based 
standard because: 
[The student] knew that the electronic response would 
be . . . published beyond her home and could reasonably be 
expected to reach the school or impact the school 
environment. [The student] also knew that the dialogue 
would and did take place among . . . students whom she 
invited to join the [webpage] and that the fallout from her 
conduct and the speech within the group would be felt in the 
school itself.128  
Here, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning for satisfying its nexus-based 
standard in Kowalski makes the application of the nexus-based standard 
                                                                                                                     
 124. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 125. Id. at 573. 
 126. Shaver, supra note 35, at 1595 n.435. 
 127. 799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 128. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573. 
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virtually identical to the Second and Eighth Circuits’ reasonable-
foreseeability standard.129  
The Fifth Circuit’s intent-based standard also lacks teeth.130 The Fifth 
Circuit concluded in Bell that the intent-based standard was satisfied 
because “[the student] intended his rap recording to reach the school 
community. . . . [The student] produced and disseminated the rap 
recording knowing students, and hoping administrators, would listen to 
it.”131 Here, the Fifth Circuit blurred an important distinction between a 
student intending cyberspeech to reach the school community (that is, an 
intent for the cyberspeech to be accessed on-campus) versus a student 
intending cyberspeech to reach a target audience including members of 
the school community.132 A student knowing or hoping fellow students 
and administrators would access her off-campus cyberspeech does not 
necessarily equate to the student intending the cyberspeech to reach the 
school community, especially when the school has policies designed to 
limit off-campus speech from being accessed or brought on-campus.133 
Whether a student evinces an intent for off-campus cyberspeech to reach 
the school community should be a fact-intensive determination requiring 
more than a student’s knowledge or hope that members in the school 
community access the off-campus cyberspeech.134  
                                                                                                                     
 129. See supra Subsection I.B.1.a. 
 130. See Shaver, supra note 35, at 1596–97 (“The intentional direction language used by the 
Fifth Circuit in Bell might, at first glance, appear to set a higher threshold because it would require 
that the student had directed speech into the school environment. However, it suffers from 
essentially the same defects as the reasonable foreseeability test. Again, the threshold for 
imposition of authority is quite low if a student’s intentional direction is determined by the extent 
to which the student spoke on a matter of interest to the school community and intended that other 
students would consider the speech. As with the reasonable foreseeability test, it seems that 
students would essentially have no protection if they sought to speak about a matter in any way 
related to school and if they wanted their speech to reach others. In addition, the intentional 
direction test has the added difficulty of asking school officials to determine the subjective intent 
of a student before imposing discipline.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 131. Bell, 799 F.3d at 396. 
 132. Id.  
 133. See id. at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (including policies blocking specific website 
access on school computers and banning students’ use of or access to cell phones on-campus).  
 134. The importance of this distinction is supported by the Second and Eighth Circuits’ 
decisions addressing students’ distribution of underground periodicals, which is another common 
off-campus student-speech situation. Compare Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050–52 
(2d Cir. 1979) (holding the school violated student’s First Amendment right to free speech by 
punishing the student for distributing an underground periodical off-campus), with Bystrom v. 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 822 F.2d 747, 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding constitutional a school policy 
prohibiting students from distributing their off-campus publications on campus). Consider two 
students who publish underground periodicals. The first student distributes the periodical to 
students and faculty just before entering the school premises as the school day begins, whereas 
the second student distributes the periodical to students and faculty just as they exit the school 
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c.  Third Circuit  
The Third Circuit, in Layshock v. Hermitage School District135 and 
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, skirted the issue of 
establishing a standard for triggering Tinker’s test and just assumed, 
without deciding, that Tinker’s test is applicable to off-campus 
cyberspeech cases.136 In both cases the Third Circuit concluded the 
school districts could not establish a substantial disruption or reasonably 
forecast a substantial disruption, thus failing Tinker’s test.137 It is not clear 
what approach the Third Circuit will take when it reviews a district court 
decision with facts supporting a conclusion that a school district 
experienced a substantial disruption or could reasonably forecast a 
substantial disruption.138 Although the Third Circuit currently lacks a 
standard triggering Tinker’s substantial-disruption test in off-campus 
cyberspeech cases, this circuit appears most amenable to taking a narrow 
view of Tinker’s holding.139  
In a buried footnote of the Blue Mountain decision, the Third Circuit 
noted there was “some appeal” to the student’s argument “that the First 
Amendment ‘limits school official[s’] ability to sanction student speech 
to the schoolhouse itself.’”140 The Third Circuit ultimately concluded the 
school administration violated the student’s right to free speech, so the 
                                                                                                                     
premises after the school day ends. Both students know and hope students and faculty will access 
their periodicals. It is clear the first student evinces a stronger intent for his off-campus speech to 
reach the school community, and thus more likely to trigger Tinker’s test, because the students 
and faculty are more likely to bring the periodical with them inside the schoolhouse gate. But it 
is less clear whether the second student intended for the periodical to reach the school community. 
 135. 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 136. Id. at 219 (“We need not now define the precise parameters of when the arm of authority 
can reach beyond the schoolhouse gate because . . . the district court found that [the student’s] 
conduct did not disrupt the school, and the District does not appeal that finding.”); J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The Supreme Court 
established a basic framework for assessing student free speech claims in Tinker, and we will 
assume, without deciding, that Tinker applies to [the student’s] speech in this case.”). 
 137. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219; Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 930–31. 
 138. See, e.g., A.N. v. Upper Perkiomen Sch. Dist., 228 F. Supp. 3d 391, 400–01 (E.D. Pa. 
2017) (denying suspended student’s emergency motion for preliminary injunction seeking 
immediate reinstatement because student was unlikely to succeed on the merits that school 
violated student’s right to free speech in punishing him for an Instagram post mashing up a Sandy 
Hook video and song about school shooting, which could reasonably lead the school district to 
forecast a substantial disruption). 
 139. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 933 (“Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever 
allowed schools to punish students for off-campus speech that is not school-sponsored or at a 
school-sponsored event and that caused no substantial disruption at school. . . . An opposite 
holding would significantly broaden school districts’ authority over student speech and would 
vest school officials with dangerously overbroad censorship discretion.”). 
 140. Id. at 926 n.3. 
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majority declined to address the merits of location-determinative 
analysis.141 Instead, Third Circuit judges took to concurrences and 
dissents to debate the merits of location-determinative analysis.142  
2.  Third Circuit Debate on Location-Determinative Analysis 
In Blue Mountain, Judge Brooks Smith’s concurrence (joined by four 
Third Circuit judges) and Judge Michael Fisher’s dissent (joined by five 
Third Circuit judges) specifically debated the role location should play in 
determining whether Tinker’s test is applicable to students’ off-campus 
cyberspeech cases. Judge Smith’s concurrence argues against applying 
Tinker’s test to off-campus student speech, except off-campus speech that 
is “intentionally directed towards a school [which] is properly considered 
on-campus speech.”143 Judge Fisher’s dissent argues Tinker’s test should 
govern “off-campus speech which causes substantial on-campus 
disruption under Tinker.”144 Both opinions differ on their interpretation 
of Tinker’s language, particularly the phrase “in class or out of it.”145 Both 
opinions also offer slippery-slope arguments, where Judge Smith thrusts 
a concern of school officials’ overreach and Judge Fisher parries with a 
concern about “leav[ing] schools defenseless to protect teachers and 
school officials against [students’] attacks and powerless to discipline 
students for the consequences of their actions.”146  
Judges Smith and Fisher strike at the heart of issue debating whether 
the Tinker Court meant the phrase “in class or out of it” to limit 
application of Tinker’s test solely to on-campus speech or to off-campus 
speech as well. Judge Smith took the narrow view finding the Tinker 
Court meant to limit its test to on-campus speech, for “[h]ad the Court 
intended to vest schools with the unprecedented authority to regulate 
students’ off-campus speech, surely it would have done so 
unambiguously.”147 Judge Smith supported his interpretation of the 
phrase “in class or out of it” by reading it in context with its immediately 
preceding sentences,148 where the Tinker Court stated: 
The principle of these cases is not confined to the 
supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in the 
classroom. The principal use to which the schools are 
dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed 
hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among 
                                                                                                                     
 141. Id. at 926 n.3, 931. 
 142. Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring); id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 144. Id. at 943 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 145. Compare id. at 937–38 n.1 (Smith, J., concurring), with id. at 942 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring); id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 937–38 n.1 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. 
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those activities is personal intercommunication among the 
students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of 
attending school; it is also an important part of the 
educational process. A student’s rights, therefore, do not 
embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the 
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during 
the authorized hours, he may express his opinions . . . if he 
does so without “materially and substantially interfer[ing] 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school” and without colliding with the 
rights of others.149 
To Judge Smith, the plain meaning of the Tinker Court’s language is 
unambiguous and limits Tinker’s substantial-disruption test to on-campus 
student speech. Judge Fisher disagrees.  
Judge Fisher found the phrase “in class or out of it” ambiguous, or as 
Judge Fisher put it, “unclear.”150 Judge Fisher was uncertain whether the 
phrase was meant to distinguish students’ on-campus speech from off-
campus speech—in which case Tinker’s test would apply to off-campus 
student speech—or to distinguish students’ on-campus speech in the 
classroom from other places on the school grounds—in which case 
Tinker’s test would not apply to off-campus student speech.151 But Judge 
Fisher was certain of two things. First, the Court did not address the issue 
of whether Tinker’s test should apply to off-campus student speech; 
second, Tinker’s test should determine the outcome of that case.152  
Permeating Judges Smith and Fisher’s debate are public policy 
rationales. Judge Smith expressed two concerns. How long should the 
long arm of the school’s regulatory powers over student speech be?153 
And would applying Tinker’s test to off-campus speech give rise to a 
scenario where adults could be regulated for their off-campus speech 
causing substantial disruptions in a school?154 The first concern is clearly 
more legitimate than the second, which Judge Smith noted is “absurd.”155 
Parents bring civil suits in federal courts precisely because they do not 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969) (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 
1966)). 
 150. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 942 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 943. 
 153. Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring) (“Applying Tinker to off-campus speech would create 
a precedent with ominous implications. Doing so would empower schools to regulate students’ 
expressive activity no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it 
involves—so long as it causes a substantial disruption at school.”). 
 154. Id. at 940. 
 155. Id. 
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believe the school should have the regulatory power to punish their 
children for speech that occurred when the children were in the comfort 
of their homes or elsewhere outside the schoolhouse gate. Those parents 
do not share Judge Smith’s concern that they will be punished by a school 
for their off-campus speech, not because Tinker’s test could not be 
applied equally between students and their parents, but because it is 
absurd to “extend[] Tinker beyond the public-school setting to which it is 
so firmly moored.”156  
Judge Fisher’s public policy concern centered upon the distinction 
between the political speech protected in Tinker and the vulgar speech 
protected in Blue Mountain. Judge Fisher was most concerned about the 
negative effects the vulgar speech in Blue Mountain could have on 
educators and their families.157 Whereas Tinker involved the political 
speech of wearing of an armband to protest the Vietnam War, which 
Judge Fisher agreed deserved protection under the First Amendment,158 
Blue Mountain involved the creation of a fake MySpace profile of an 
educator accusing that educator of sexual misconduct.159 Judge Fisher did 
not see the profile as a nonsensical, juvenile joke, as the majority did.160 
Judge Fisher saw the profile, and ones similar to it, as capable of causing 
educators psychological harm to the point that they cannot interact 
sufficiently with students or quit their jobs altogether.161  
Under the dissent’s reasoning, it should be left to the school to 
determine “how it should handle violations of its policy that are of as 
serious and grave a matter as false accusations of sexual misconduct.”162 
Judge Fisher believes “[s]chool administrators, not judges, are best 
positioned to assess the potential for harm in cases like this one, and we 
should be loath to substitute our judgments for theirs.”163 But a potential 
gap in Judge Fisher’s public policy argument is that it presupposes 
Tinker’s test is applicable equally to on-campus and off-campus 
cyberspeech cases. 
Shifting from the underlying public policy to the practical application 
of legal tests and standards for off-campus cyberspeech cases, Judge 
Smith notes that public policy concerns are “only half the battle.”164 The 
other half of the battle involves how courts should determine whether 
                                                                                                                     
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 946 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 158. Id. at 943–44. 
 159. Id. at 948–49. 
 160. Id. at 948. 
 161. Id. at 947. 
 162. Id. at 948. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). 
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cyberspeech is off-campus or on-campus speech. Judge Smith admits this 
is a difficult task due to the “‘everywhere at once’ nature of the 
internet.”165 Here, Judge Fisher agrees with Judge Smith.166 Daring not 
to define an exact test or standard to be used to determine whether 
cyberspeech is on-campus or off-campus, Judge Smith explains why he 
would favor an intent-based standard over a reasonable-foreseeability 
standard.167 Judge Smith would allow off-campus cyberspeech 
“intentionally directed towards a school [to be] properly considered on-
campus speech.”168 Viewed alone, this intent-based argument could 
single-handedly undermine Judge Smith’s argument that students’ off-
campus cyberspeech discussing school matters should not be subject to 
Tinker’s test. Opponents would simply argue students’ off-campus 
cyberspeech concerning school matters is intentionally directed towards 
the school because the speech will inevitably reach students, teachers, 
and administrators.  
Judge Smith is careful to qualify his argument for an intent-based 
standard with a countervailing argument against a reasonable-
foreseeability standard.169 Judge Smith warns that off-campus student 
speech does not “mutate into on-campus speech simply because it 
foreseeably makes its way onto campus.”170 He further criticizes “[a] bare 
foreseeability standard [because it] could be stretched too far, and would 
risk ensnaring any off-campus expression that happened to discuss 
school-related matters.”171 Unsurprisingly, Judge Fisher favors adopting 
the Second Circuit’s reasonable-foreseeability standard172 in applying 
Tinker’s test to off-campus student-speech cases. Noting public-school 
students’ near-universal access to wireless technology, Judge Fisher 
worries “offensive and malicious speech [] directed at school officials 
and disseminated online to the student body” will inevitably and 
negatively impact the school environment.173  
To conclude their opinions, Judges Smith and Fisher again look to 
public policy rationales for support. On the one hand, Judge Smith 
proposes that his opinion supports a robust marketplace of ideas, where 
society must “tolerate thoughtless speech . . . in order to provide adequate 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 951 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“The line between ‘on-campus’ and ‘off-campus’ 
speech is not as clear as it once was.”). 
 167. Id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See supra Subsection I.B.1.a. 
 173. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 951–52 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
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breathing room for valuable robust speech.”174 Judge Fisher proposes that 
his opinion supports an “orderly learning environment” necessary for 
children’s development.175 A robust marketplace of ideas and an orderly 
learning environment are not mutually exclusive, and most would agree 
that society supports both. But in the context of students’ off-campus 
cyberspeech cases, these two ideas are at odds. Which idea comes out on 
top in these cases will depend largely on the standards lower federal 
courts use to trigger the application of Tinker’s test to off-campus 
cyberspeech cases.  
C.  District Courts’ Adoption of Circuits’ Different Triggers 
District courts faithfully adhere to the standards set by their respective 
circuit courts when determining whether to apply Tinker’s substantial-
disruption test in students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases. Two cases out 
of the District Court for the District of Minnesota, R.S. v. Minnewaska 
Area School District # 2149176 and Sagehorn v. Independent School 
District # 728,177 illustrate how district courts followed the Eighth 
Circuit’s reasonable-foreseeability standard established in DJM v. 
Hannibal Public School District # 60.178 Another case out of the District 
Court for the District of Oregon, Burge ex rel. Burge v. Colton School 
District 53,179 illustrated how a district court applied the Ninth Circuit’s 
true-threat-based standard from Wynar v. Douglas County School 
District.180 
What is more interesting is how district courts approach the issue of 
whether to apply Tinker’s test if its circuit has not established a standard 
for triggering Tinker’s test in an off-campus cyberspeech case. This 
                                                                                                                     
 174. Id. at 941 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 175. Id. at 952 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 176. 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Minn. 2012). 
 177. 122 F. Supp. 3d 842 (D. Minn. 2015). 
 178. 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Here it was reasonably foreseeable that D.J.M.’s 
threats . . . would be brought to the attention of school authorities and create a risk of substantial 
disruption of the school environment.”); Minnewaska, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (“The law on out-
of-school statements by students can thus be summarized as follows: Such statements are 
protected under the First Amendment and not punishable by school authorities unless they are 
true threats or are reasonably calculated to reach the school environment and are so egregious as 
to pose a serious safety risk or other substantial disruption in that environment.”); Sagehorn, 122 
F. Supp. 3d at 856–57 (following the Minnewaska framework). 
 179. 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (D. Or. 2015). 
 180. 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen faced with an identifiable threat of school 
violence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that meets the 
requirements of Tinker.”); Burge, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1071 (“Under Wynar, if [the student’s] off-
campus comments constitute ‘an identifiable threat of school violence’ and would substantially 
disrupt or materially interfere with school activities, then [the school] could discipline him without 
violating the First Amendment.”). 
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occurred in 2010 at the District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit)181 and the District Court for 
the Central District of California (9th Circuit pre-Wynar),182 in 2011 at 
the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana (U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit),183 and in 2013 at the District Court for 
the Western District of Tennessee (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit).184 After thorough discussions of Tinker and its progeny as well 
as other circuit and district court decisions, these district courts adopted 
different standards for triggering the application of Tinker’s test to their 
respective off-campus cyberspeech cases.  
The district court in Evans v. Bayer185 reasoned from Second and 
Third Circuit decisions that “[s]tudent off-campus speech, though 
generally protected, could be subject to analysis under the Tinker 
standard as well if the speech raises on-campus concerns,”186 and the 
district court held that a student’s Facebook page was protected speech 
because the page did not cause a substantial disruption nor was it “lewd, 
vulgar, threatening, or advocating illegal or dangerous behavior.”187  
The district court in J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School 
District188 applied a reasonable-foreseeability standard and found that it 
was reasonably foreseeable for a student’s YouTube video to make its 
way on-campus, triggering and satisfying Tinker’s test.189  
The district court in T.V. ex rel. R.V. v. Smith-Green Community 
School Corporation190 followed the Third Circuit’s decision in Blue 
Mountain assuming, without deciding, that Tinker’s test applied because 
the school could not prove students’ photos posted on the internet caused, 
or could reasonably be forecasted to cause, a substantial disruption.191  
Finally, the district court in Nixon v. Hardin County Board of 
Education192 failed to articulate a coherent standard, but it focused on 
whether the social-media posts had a “connection to [the school]” (nexus-
based), was “made at school” (location-based), “directed at the school” 
                                                                                                                     
 181. See Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010).  
 182. See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010). 
 183. See T.V. ex rel. R.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ind. 
2011). 
 184. See Nixon v. Hardin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 988 F. Supp. 2d 826 (W.D. Tenn. 2013). 
 185. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010).  
 186. Id. at 1370.  
 187. Id. at 1374.  
 188. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 189. Id. at 1107–08.   
 190. 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 191. Id. at 781, 784. 
 192. 988 F. Supp. 2d 826 (W.D. Tenn. 2013). 
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(intent-based), or “involved the use of school time or equipment” (nexus-
based).193 The Nixon court determined the student’s off-campus 
cyberspeech failed to both meet these standards and cause a substantial 
disruption.194  
With the circuit courts divided on the standards for triggering Tinker’s 
test, it is logical that district courts without binding precedent would be 
divided as well. With differing standards at the circuit and district courts, 
it follows that the degree of First Amendment protection afforded to a 
student for her off-campus cyberspeech turns upon what standard the 
federal court uses to trigger Tinker’s test. Theoretically, state courts 
provide another option for parents wanting to bring civil suits against 
schools for punishing their children for off-campus cyberspeech. Part II 
demonstrates that this option has rarely been utilized. 
II.  STATE APPROACH TO OFF-CAMPUS CYBERSPEECH 
This Part’s title may be misleading because the state approach to 
handling students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases is virtually non-existent 
and guided almost entirely by the federal approach. It is the sheer lack of 
a state approach that makes this Part so critical in addressing a major 
opportunity for reforming how the legal system approaches students’ off-
campus cyberspeech cases. Legal scholarship has given short attention to 
how state law can impact students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases.195 
Section II.A discusses the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s approach in 
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District196—one of the only cases, if not 
the only case, before a state’s highest court concerning a student’s on-
campus cyberspeech.197 Section II.B discusses how federal circuit and 
district courts hint at how state constitutional provisions, statutes, and 
regulations can play a larger role in students’ off-campus cyberspeech 
cases. 
A.  State Approach Subordinate to Federal Approach 
In J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania considered whether a middle school permissibly 
punished—in accordance with the U.S. Constitution, not the 
Pennsylvania Constitution—a student for creating a website titled, 
                                                                                                                     
 193. Id. at 830, 839.  
 194. Id. at 839. 
 195. See Philip Lee, Expanding the Schoolhouse Gate: Public Schools (K-12) and the 
Regulation of Cyberbullying, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 831, 849–50.  
 196. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
 197. As opposed to an off-campus cyberspeech case where the student does not access her 
off-campus cyberspeech while at school, Bethlehem is an on-campus cyberspeech case because 
the student accessed his website at school and showed it to a peer. Id. at 865.  
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“Teacher Sux,” and posting vulgar material on that website about 
principals and a teacher.198 The reason the student did not allege a 
violation of his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution 
is that the right to free speech is no greater under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution than it is under the U.S. Constitution.199 Therefore, the court 
set out to analyze this case in conformity with federal case law, namely 
Tinker and its progeny at that time, Fraser and Hazelwood.200 
The court determined the “constitutional analysis of a student’s 
freedom of speech must include a number of considerations,” the first of 
which was the location of the speech.201 The court found a “sufficient 
nexus between the web site and the school” to consider the student’s off-
campus cyberspeech to be on-campus because the student accessed his 
website while at school and showed it to a fellow student, school faculty 
and administrators accessed the website at school, the website was 
“aimed . . . at the specific audience of students and others connected with 
this particular School District,” and the principal and a teacher were 
“subjects of the site.”202 Therefore, the court held that “where speech that 
is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto the 
school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will be 
considered on-campus speech.”203 
First Amendment protection of students’ on-campus cyberspeech is 
outside the scope of this Note, however, Bethlehem is important for two 
reasons. First, Bethlehem established that the court’s first consideration 
of the constitutional analysis was the location of the cyberspeech.204 At 
first blush, it appears the court may be amenable to a location-
determinative analysis of students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases, but 
buried in a footnote, the court acknowledged it would “not rule out a 
holding that purely off-campus speech may nevertheless be subject to 
regulation or punishment by a school district if the dictates of Tinker are 
                                                                                                                     
 198. Id. at 850–51. 
 199. Id. at 853 n.5 (citing Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 (1991)); see also PA. 
CONST. art. I, § 7 (“The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable 
rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak . . . on any subject, being responsible for the 
abuse of that liberty.”); Edmunds, 526 Pa. at 393 (“[T]he Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was 
the ‘direct precursor’ of the freedom of speech and press.”).  
 200. Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 860–64. 
 201. Id. at 864 (“First, a threshold issue regarding the ‘location’ of the speech must be 
resolved to determine if the unique concerns regarding the school environment are even 
implicated, i.e., is it on campus speech or purely off-campus speech?”). 
 202. Id. at 865. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 864. 
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satisfied.”205 Bethlehem fits neatly within the federal jurisprudence on 
student off-campus cyberspeech cases.  
The second reason Bethlehem is important is its breathtakingly broad 
holding of how off-campus speech can mutate into on-campus speech. If 
a student’s off-campus cyberspeech discusses her school or any of the 
school’s personnel and that cyberspeech is “brought onto the school 
campus” by anyone, the off-campus speech mutates into on-campus 
speech.206 In other words, everything a student says about her school and 
its personnel through cyberspeech is on-campus speech under this 
holding, so long as it makes its way inside the schoolhouse gate. There 
would be no such thing as off-campus cyberspeech that addresses specific 
schools or school personnel. 
Even if the court had determined the students’ cyberspeech took place 
off-campus, it also found that the cyberspeech caused a substantial 
disruption under Tinker’s test.207 Therefore, unless the court determined 
Tinker’s test did not apply to students’ off-campus cyberspeech, then the 
court would reach the same conclusion: The school permissibly punished 
the student for his website and its content. Therefore, Bethlehem likely 
does not instill confidence in Pennsylvania’s parents and students 
contemplating bringing off-campus cyberspeech cases before 
Pennsylvania’s state courts.   
As discussed in Subsection I.B.1, not a single federal circuit court has 
utilized location-determinative analysis in determining whether Tinker’s 
test is applicable to students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases. Yet, there is 
hope for students and their parents when looking closely at how lower 
federal courts addressed the applicability of state constitutions, statutes, 
and regulations in these cases. 
B.  Federal Court Cases Addressing Applicability of State Law 
Some of the lower federal court decisions, discussed earlier, address 
how state constitutions, statutes, and regulations may provide an effective 
means for students and their parents to bring claims that students’ off-
campus cyberspeech should be provided greater protection than the U.S. 
Constitution’s First Amendment provides pursuant to lower federal 
courts’ interpretations of Tinker and its progeny cases. The only issue is 
that not all states provide constitutions, statutes, or regulations offering 
these protections. Doninger v. Niehoff, J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain School District, and R.L. v. Central York School District208 
                                                                                                                     
 205. Id. at 864 n.11. 
 206. Id. at 865. 
 207. Id. at 869.  
 208. 183 F. Supp. 3d 625 (M.D. Pa. 2016). 
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each provide an example of how the states could offer new avenues for 
future litigation. 
At the district court level in Doninger, the student claimed her school 
violated her right to free speech under the Connecticut Constitution.209 
The district court dismissed without prejudice the student’s state 
constitutional claim by refusing to grant supplemental jurisdiction,210 and 
the Second Circuit affirmed this decision.211 The district court offered a 
variety of reasons for its dismissal—the brief spent less than two pages 
on the claim; the brief did not identify any Connecticut case deciding the 
Connecticut Constitution affords greater free-speech protections for 
public-school students than does the U.S. Constitution; the Connecticut 
Constitution may not afford money damages for a violation of one’s free 
speech right; deciding whether a state constitution grants greater 
protections than the U.S. Constitution is not the role of federal courts.212 
Offering a glimmer of hope, the district court noted, “Ms. Doninger is, of 
course, free to pursue her [state constitutional] claims in state court.”213 
In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third 
Circuit held that the school’s suspension of the student for creating a fake 
MySpace profile of the principal violated his First Amendment right to 
free speech because the school did not satisfy Tinker’s test.214 Less 
obvious was the court’s holding in a footnote that the school’s 
punishment violated a Pennsylvania statute—24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 5-510—
limiting school districts to 
adopt[ing] and enforce[ing] such reasonable rules and 
regulations . . . regarding the conduct and deportment of all 
pupils attending the public schools in the district, during 
such time as they are under the supervision of the board of 
school directors and teachers, including the time necessarily 
spent in coming to and returning from school.215 
The Third Circuit looked to how a state case interpreted the statute and 
concluded that it prohibited the school district from “punishing students 
for conduct occurring outside of school hours—even if such conduct 
occurs on school property.”216 Therefore, the Third Circuit reasoned that 
                                                                                                                     
 209. Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 228 (D. Conn. 2009); see CONN. CONST. art. 
I, § 4 (“Every citizen may freely speak . . . his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for 
the abuse of that liberty.”). 
 210. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 229. 
 211. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 357 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 212. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 228–29. 
 213. Id. at 229. 
 214. 650 F.3d 915, 931 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 215. Id. at 929 n.5 (alteration in original) (quoting 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5–510). 
 216. Id. 
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student conduct occurring during non-school hours and off campus would 
also be protected.217  
In his dissent to Blue Mountain, Judge Fisher distinguished the facts 
of the state case interpreting the statute from the facts of Blue Mountain, 
finding that the state case involved student’s conduct at school during 
non-school hours that “had no effect on the school,” whereas Blue 
Mountain involved student conduct that “had a foreseeable impact on the 
operations of the classroom.”218 Therefore, Judge Fisher would hold that 
the statute is not as exhaustive as the majority holds and the statute does 
not prohibit regulations of “out-of-school conduct that threatens to 
materially interfere with the educational process.”219 Nevertheless, Blue 
Mountain provides an example where a state statute is interpreted to 
protect a student’s off-campus cyberspeech. 
In the federal district court case of R.L. v. Central York School 
District, a student claimed that the school violated his free speech rights 
under a Pennsylvania’s Administrative Code, 22 Pa. Code § 12.9(b), 
which states “[s]tudents shall have the right to express themselves unless 
the expression materially and substantially interferes with the educational 
process, threatens serious harm to the school or community, encourages 
unlawful activity or interferes with another individual’s rights.”220 
Finding that the language substantially similar to Tinker’s test, the district 
court held that if the drafters intended to expand students’ speech rights 
beyond those protected in Tinker, then the drafters would have done so 
explicitly.221 Although this is an example where a state regulatory code 
failed to protect a student’s off-campus cyberspeech, the analysis 
implicitly recognizes the possibility that a regulatory code could be 
drafted and implemented to shield students from school punishment for 
their off-campus cyberspeech. 
What is garnered from these three federal cases is the possibility that 
states can enact laws providing their students stronger free speech 
protections for off-campus cyberspeech than the lower federal courts 
currently provide. These cases also offer two important notes for 
litigation strategy. First, to argue that a student receives greater free 
speech protections under a state constitution than under the U.S. 
Constitution, an off-campus cyberspeech case should only be brought in 
federal court if there is case law supporting such an argument. Otherwise, 
the argument should be brought before a state court. Second, to argue that 
a student receives greater free speech protections under a state statute or 
regulation than that under federal law, an off-campus cyberspeech case 
                                                                                                                     
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 949–50 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 219. Id. at 950, 950 n.7. 
 220. 183 F. Supp. 3d 625, 641 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting 22 PA. CODE § 12.9(b)). 
 221. Id. at 642. 
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can be brought in federal or state court, but the outcome will likely turn 
upon the breadth of the statute, including whether the statute or 
regulation’s language tracks or explicitly departs from the language of 
Tinker’s test. 
III.  PROTECTING THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT 
 Courts and school administrations have legitimate concerns for the 
protection of the school environment from the negative effects associated 
with students’ off-campus cyberspeech. These concerns primarily 
involve the protection of students’ and faculty members’ well-being and 
reputations, as well as the promotion of an orderly learning environment. 
In his dissent to Blue Mountain, Judge Fisher summarized the concern 
that narrowly applying Tinker’s test—or worse, scrapping or limiting the 
application of Tinker’s test—to off-campus cyberspeech cases “leaves 
schools defenseless to protect teachers and school officials against 
[students’] attacks and powerless to discipline students for the 
consequences of their actions.”222 This Part challenges this contention on 
two fronts. Section III.A challenges whether scrapping, limiting, or 
narrowing the application of Tinker’s test will leave school 
administrations defenseless. Section III.B challenges whether school 
administrative punishment provides the best protection for the school 
environment, as well as society at large. 
A.  Alternatives to School Administrative Punishment 
 Lower federal courts’ decisions in students’ off-campus cyberspeech 
cases show school administrations are most concerned about three types 
of off-campus cyberspeech: (1) threatening; (2) bullying or harassing; 
and (3) defamatory. Most students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases fall 
into one or more of these categories. To date, lower federal courts have 
utilized the application of Tinker’s test to either uphold or enjoin school 
administrations’ punishments of students for these types of off-campus 
cyberspeech. However, Judge Fisher’s concern that scrapping, limiting, 
or narrowing the application of Tinker’s test would leave school 
administrations defenseless against these types of off-campus 
cyberspeech does not appear well-founded. There are alternative 
governmental and private causes of action that can provide redress for 
these types of off-campus cyberspeech. 
1.  True Threats 
 School administrations are never defenseless when punishing a 
student for her off-campus speech when that speech constitutes a true 
threat, defined as a: “serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
                                                                                                                     
 222. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).  
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unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The 
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”223 The Supreme 
Court has concluded that true threats do not receive First Amendment 
protection from state punishment.224 Thus, the application of Tinker’s test 
does not appear necessary for a court to uphold a school administration’s 
punishment of a student for her off-campus cyberspeech if it constitutes 
a true threat. 
 Several federal circuit courts have addressed off-campus cyberspeech 
cases in which the cyberspeech either could have been deemed a true 
threat or was found to be a true threat. The Second and Fifth Circuits 
applied Tinker’s test and chose not to engage in true-threat analysis 
because the off-campus cyberspeech at issue satisfied Tinker’s test.225 
The Ninth Circuit fashioned a true-threat-based standard for triggering 
Tinker’s test because that “approach . . . strikes the appropriate balance 
between allowing schools to act to protect their students from credible 
threats of violence while recognizing and protecting freedom of 
expression by students.”226 Finally, the Eighth Circuit both engaged in 
true-threat analysis and applied Tinker’s test, finding the off-campus 
cyberspeech at issue not protected under either approach.227 Despite this 
variation, these circuit court opinions support the contention that school 
administrations may punish students for off-campus cyberspeech that 
constitutes a true threat without any concern of abridging a student’s First 
Amendment right to free speech. Various legal scholars have either 
agreed with or advocated for the position that Tinker’s test is not 
necessary to uphold school administrative punishment in the true-threat 
context.228 
2.  Cyberbullying and Online Harassment 
 Many legal scholars have recently addressed, and offered solutions 
on, the issue of how the legal system should address students’ off-campus 
cyberspeech that constitutes cyberbullying or online harassment. At one 
                                                                                                                     
 223. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (citation omitted). 
 224. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).  
 225. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 400 (5th Cir. 2015); Wisniewski v. 
Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 226. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen 
faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take disciplinary action in 
response to off-campus speech that meets the requirements of Tinker.”). 
 227. DJM v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 764, 766 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 228. See Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt 
Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying Policy that Considers First Amendment, Due Process, 
and Fourth Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 661–62 (2011); Shaver, supra 
note 35, at 1581–88; Ari Ezra Waldman, Triggering Tinker: Student Speech in the Age of 
Cyberharassment, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 428, 430, 430 nn.6–7 (2017). 
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end, some scholars support triggering Tinker’s test through the 
reasonable-foreseeability standard and nexus-based standard.229 At the 
other end, one scholar rejects the application of Tinker’s test but 
advocates for non-punitive, anti-bullying programs.230 In the middle, one 
scholar even proposes the application of Tinker’s second, less-discussed 
“rights of others” prong.231 
 Due to the many terrible stories of children and young adults 
victimized by the horrors of cyberbullying and online harassment, states 
have enacted several laws related to the subject. All fifty states have some 
form of bullying or harassment law, or both: forty-nine states’ laws 
require a school policy on cyberbullying; forty-eight states’ laws 
explicitly include cyberbullying or online harassment, or both; forty-five 
states’ laws permit school sanctions for cyberbullying; but only sixteen 
states permit school sanctions for off-campus cyberbullying or online 
harassment.232 Some legal scholars advocate that more states should enact 
cyberbullying and online harassment laws permitting school sanctions for 
off-campus cyberbullying or online harassment.233 Even if states do not 
enact such laws, many exist in application. For example, in Kowalski v. 
Berkeley County Schools, the Fourth Circuit triggered Tinker’s test and 
upheld the school administration’s punishment of a student for her 
bullying and harassing off-campus cyberspeech, even though West 
Virginia’s anti-bullying law did not provide for school sanctions for off-
campus cyberbullying or online harassment.234 
 If lower federal courts are going to follow the Kowalski approach, then 
states’ cyberbullying and online harassment laws will not be successful 
in limiting school administrative punishment to students’ on-campus 
cyberspeech constituting cyberbullying or online harassment. It is 
possible school administrations could seek to honor legislative intent and 
refer cases of cyberbullying and online harassment to other governmental 
authorities, such as the police, or parents of those involved. Forty-four 
states enacted laws permitting criminal sanctions for cyberbullying or 
online harassment,235 but some legal scholars have criticized these 
                                                                                                                     
 229. Goodno, supra note 228, at 696–97 (offering model statute); Lee, supra note 195, at 
884 (supporting reasonable-foreseeability or nexus-based standard); Waldman, supra note 228, at 
450–52 (arguing for “relational nexus” standard). 
 230. Papandrea, supra note 98, at 1098–1101.  
 231. Shaver, supra note 35, at 1589. 
 232. Bullying Laws Across America, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR. (2017), 
https://cyberbullying.org/bullying-laws. 
 233. Goodno, supra note 228, at 696–98; Lee, supra note 195, at 884. 
 234. Lee, supra note 195, at 884. 
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statutes as poorly drafted, overbroad, and potentially in violation of the 
First Amendment.236  
3.  Defamation 
 An action for defamation is an option for students and faculty 
members who are maligned by students’ off-campus cyberspeech, 
whether it be parody profiles or negative reviews. Off-campus 
cyberspeech cases involving parody profiles and negative reviews, which 
are the cases best suited for a defamation action, are also the cases in 
which most students prevailed because the cyberspeech failed to satisfy 
the Tinker-test requirement that there be a substantial disruption, or the 
reasonable foreseeability of a substantial disruption.237  
 However, there are many reasons why faculty or students may prefer 
school administrative punishment to a defamation action. First, it is not 
clear whether an action for defamation can offer faculty and students any 
better odds in cases involving parody pages, negative reviews, or similar 
off-campus cyberspeech. Legal scholars have also recognized that 
defamation actions fail to offer remedies that “acknowledge the unique 
nature of the digital world.”238 Finally, parents and faculty members 
pursuing the defamation action could bear the high costs of civil litigation 
under certain fee arrangements. 
B.  School Administrative Punishment and School-to-Prison Pipeline 
 The school administrative punishment at issue in students’ off-
campus cyberspeech cases often consists of suspensions and 
expulsions. Both of these forms of punishment are “[e]xclusionary 
discipline . . . [that] is commonly understood to be a ‘drastic’ remedy, 
one with enormous downsides that can change the trajectory of a child’s 
life forever.”239 A 2014 report by the Council of State Governments found 
that suspended students are “at a significantly higher risk of falling 
behind academically, dropping out of school, and coming into contact 
with the juvenile justice system.” 240 The same report also explained that 
these “risks exist whether a student misses classes during in-school 
                                                                                                                     
 236. See Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 
77 MO. L. REV. 693, 698 (2012). 
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suspension, during an out-of-school suspension that lasts only a few days, 
or is excluded for weeks or months.”241 
 Proponents of applying Tinker’s test in off-campus cyberspeech cases 
dealing with cyberbullying or online harassment have put forth the 
argument that schools are in the best position to remedy these situations, 
in part because a suspension or expulsion does not derail a child or young 
adult’s life to the same degree as a criminal conviction for the same 
offense.242 However, legal scholars examining the school-to-prison 
pipeline would caution that school administrative punishment consisting 
of exclusionary discipline may not be as effective a remedy as previously 
thought.243 
IV.  DIGITIZING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE 
During the Internet era, technology has enabled students to produce 
various forms of cyberspeech accessible by anyone anywhere at any time. 
As a result, anyone with access to a student’s texts, e-mails, instant 
messages, posts, blogs, and other forms of cyberspeech can reproduce 
that student’s cyberspeech in a matter of seconds at any location with Wi-
Fi or cellular service. According to Pew’s most recent research study of 
teens’ social media and technology use, of teens ages thirteen to 
seventeen, 92% go online every day, nearly 75% have access to a 
smartphone, and 71% join more than one social networking site.244 The 
increasing rates of wireless-technology ownership and use make off-
campus cyberspeech only that much easier to access and bring inside the 
schoolhouse gate. Thus, it is reasonably foreseeable that nearly all off-
campus cyberspeech can make its way inside the schoolhouse gate and to 
a school administrator’s desk.  
By using reasonable-foreseeability or nexus-based standards to trigger 
the application of Tinker’s test to students’ off-campus cyberspeech 
cases, lower federal courts are connecting a fiber-optic cable from the 
schoolhouse gate to a student’s electronic devices, mutating all off-
campus cyberspeech into on-campus cyberspeech. As a result of this 
trend, legal scholars—like Professors Papandrea, Lee Goldman, and Clay 
Calvert—have argued Tinker’s test should either no longer be applied to 
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off-campus cyberspeech cases245 or be revised to better protect students’ 
right to free speech.246  
This Part contends that the schoolhouse gate should be digitized to 
adequately protect students’ First Amendment right to free speech in the 
Internet era. Section IV.A agrees with and builds upon those legal 
scholars’ contention that Tinker’s test should be scrapped or at least 
narrowed, arguing that students’ cyberspeech, despite its “everywhere at 
once” nature, should be treated like other forms of student speech that 
receive greater free speech protections off-campus than they do on-
campus. Section IV.A’s new federal approach is designed to aid federal 
courts in this pursuit to unwire Tinker’s test for the wireless world. 
Section IV.B’s new state approach is designed to help states switch 
the safety on Tinker’s triggers by prohibiting school administrations from 
punishing students for their off-campus cyberspeech, except when that 
cyberspeech is either a true threat or unlawful (for example, 
cyberbullying, harassment, and defamation). This new state approach can 
adequately protect the school environment while providing students 
stronger free speech protections for their off-campus cyberspeech. 
A.  Unwiring Tinker for the Wireless World: A New Federal Approach 
Erwin Chemerinsky once described Tinker as the “most important 
Supreme Court case in history protecting the constitutional rights of 
students.”247 Tinker originally stood for the proposition that students do 
not shed their constitutional rights when entering the schoolhouse gate.248 
Today, Tinker stands for the proposition that school administrations do 
not surrender their power to punish students after students exit the 
schoolhouse gate.  
The standards federal courts use to trigger Tinker’s test can determine 
whether students’ off-campus cyberspeech will be protected under the 
First Amendment.249 Further, Papandrea warns that once Tinker’s test is 
triggered “many courts are far too deferential to schools’ assertions that 
the challenged [student-speech] was substantially and materially 
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disruptive to schoolwork or discipline.”250 This Note argues that under a 
new federal approach, federal courts should either do one of two things. 
First, federal courts can scrap Tinker’s test and apply full First 
Amendment free speech protections to off-campus cyberspeech cases. 
Second, federal courts can employ a more stringent standard for 
triggering Tinker’s test. 
Before discussing how to scrap or limit Tinker’s test, it is important to 
reiterate that several legal scholars believe Tinker’s test is beneficial in 
application to all or some of students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases. As 
discussed in Subsection III.A.2, some legal scholars, including Naomi 
Goodno, Philip Lee, and Ari Waldman, also argue that Tinker’s test 
serves a unique purpose in addressing cyberbullying and online 
harassment.251  
In a study of federal district court cyberspeech cases, Professor Tova 
Wolking concluded that district courts “used [Tinker’s] balancing test to 
uphold students’ off-campus cyber expression unless it is outweighed by 
the countervailing rights of teachers or other students.”252 Wolking 
favorably viewed how district courts approached and analyzed students’ 
off-campus cyberspeech cases,253 and she created a three-part 
“Framework for Electronic (‘Cyber’) Speech Created Off School 
Grounds & Without School Resources.”254 Wolking’s framework 
incorporates a nebulous nexus standard—that the “student brought [the 
cyberspeech] to school or [the cyberspeech] was accessed at school”—
for triggering Tinker’s test.255 Wolking’s nexus standard appears fairly 
easy to meet because the off-campus cyberspeech need only be accessed 
on-campus by anyone to satisfy the nexus requirement. If a student brings 
the cyberspeech to school, satisfying the other prong of Wolking’s nexus 
standard, it is arguable that federal courts would consider that on-campus 
cyberspeech.256  
For those who seek to scrap, limit, or narrow the application of 
Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech cases, one of the simpler 
approaches would be to treat off-campus cyberspeech like other forms of 
                                                                                                                     
 250. Papandrea, supra note 98, at 1102. 
 251. See supra Subsection III.A.2.  
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off-campus student speech. Goldman is a supporter of this approach and 
argues that “student speech occur[ing] outside of school 
supervision . . . should receive the same First Amendment protection as 
non-student’s speech. Speech outside school supervision does not 
implicate the ‘essential characteristics’ of the school environment that 
justify special First Amendment treatment of student speech.”257 Such a 
principle has been recognized by federal circuit courts in off-campus 
student-speech cases involving underground newspapers,258 and even a 
case involving a student flipping the bird to a teacher in a restaurant 
parking lot.259 However, proponents of Tinker’s test, and even opponents 
of Tinker’s test, in the off-campus cyberspeech context have already 
acknowledged that off-campus cyberspeech is unique because of its 
everywhere-at-once nature.260 
Calvert took another approach, proposing a narrower standard than 
that of Wolking for when schools may punish students for an off-campus-
created website: 
[O]nly when a student “brings” his or her home-created Web 
site onto campus, either by downloading it on a school-
controlled computer or by encouraging other students to do 
so, that a school should be able to assert discipline authority. 
And it is only in this situation that the Tinker substantial-
and-material disruption standard would apply. . . . If the 
speech remains outside the proverbial schoolhouse gate, then 
administrators should not view juvenile Web site creators as 
students but, rather, as citizens who face the same legal 
repercussions in the civil and criminal justice systems as 
adults. School discipline becomes unnecessary in this 
situation.261 
Calvert’s standard can be extended to all forms of cyberspeech, not 
just websites. Calvert’s standard would only trigger Tinker’s substantial-
disruption analysis if the student either accesses the cyberspeech at school 
or encourages others to access the cyberspeech at school. Thus, it appears 
Calvert supports a standard that would only be triggered in a situation 
analogous to J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, in which the court 
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held a student accessing a website at school mutates off-campus 
cyberspeech into on-campus cyberspeech.262  
Papandrea takes the extreme position arguing that Tinker’s 
substantial-disruption test be scrapped and First Amendment principles 
be applied to all cyberspeech cases whether on- or off-campus.263 
Papandrea argues that schools are punishing students for “[s]peech that 
in another time would escape the school’s notice.”264 As technological 
devices become more intertwined with the lives of millennials, Papandrea 
fears how that technology may serve as “the basis for suspensions, 
expulsions, and other significant punishment.”265 Ultimately, Papandrea 
finds that Tinker now provides little in terms of First Amendment 
protections for students as federal courts employ reasonable-
foreseeability standards in triggering Tinker’s substantial-disruption test 
and gives deference to school officials in forecasting of substantial 
disruptions in the off-campus cyberspeech context.266 
Adopting Calvert’s narrow standard or heeding Papandrea’s call to 
scrap Tinker would certainly expand students’ free speech rights in the 
context of off-campus cyberspeech cases. But it seems unlikely that lower 
federal courts would do either when the courts’ analyses always account 
for the special characteristics of the school environment267 and the 
“‘everywhere at once’ nature of the internet.”268 A more moderate 
approach that may appeal to lower federal courts is treating off-campus 
cyberspeech like other forms of off-campus student speech. Another 
option would be for lower federal courts to adopt the standard applied by 
the Fifth Circuit en banc in Bell: “Tinker governs our analysis . . . when 
a student intentionally directs at the school community speech reasonably 
understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimate a teacher, 
even when such speech originated, and was disseminated, off-campus 
without the use of school resources.”269  
By including an intent element in this standard, district courts within 
the Fifth Circuit taking a more narrow view of this standard can look at 
the facts to determine whether the student intended to direct off-campus 
cyberspeech at the school community.270 The Fifth Circuit en banc also 
required that the cyberspeech be reasonably understood as threatening, 
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harassing, or intimidating to a teacher or conceivably anyone related to 
the school environment such as principals, fellow students, and other 
school employees.271 Although the Fifth Circuit en banc broadly applied 
its standard to the facts in Bell,272 such a standard could be a first step 
toward adopting narrower standards and scrapping Tinker’s substantial-
disruption test altogether, ushering in a new federal approach to off-
campus cyberspeech cases. 
B.  Switching the Safety on Tinker’s Trigger: A New State Approach 
With the Supreme Court remaining silent on off-campus cyberspeech 
cases,273 and the circuit courts adopting different standards triggering 
Tinker’s test,274 it is time for the states to supersede Tinker by enacting a 
law that adequately protects students’ First Amendment right to free 
speech in the Internet-era.  
This Note proposes the following statutory framework: 
School officials shall not punish a student for his or her off-
campus cyberspeech, unless 
(1) school officials reasonably believe the student’s off-
campus cyberspeech constitutes a true threat to any 
member of the school community; or 
(2)  the student’s off-campus cyberspeech is declared or 
adjudicated by a court to be violative of federal or state 
law; or 
(3) the student who produced the off-campus cyberspeech  
(a) intentionally brings that off-campus cyberspeech to 
school or intentionally causes another to bring that off-
campus cyberspeech to school; and  
(b) that off-campus cyberspeech causes a substantial 
disruption at school. 
Two issues that jurisdictions will need to resolve is how to define the 
terms off-campus and cyberspeech. With technological evolution, it is 
likely any definitions created will need to be amended. Beyond those 
issues, this statutory language is designed to accomplish three critical 
ends.  
First, this statutory framework explicitly creates a sphere of protection 
for students’ off-campus cyberspeech.  
                                                                                                                     
 271. Id. 
 272. See supra notes 25–35 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra Subsection I.A.3. 
 274. See supra Section I.B. 
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Second, it recognizes exceptions to address courts’ and school 
administrations’ primary concerns. This statutory framework would not 
protect off-campus cyberspeech that would constitute a true threat. It 
would not protect off-campus cyberspeech declared or adjudicated by a 
court to be unlawful, such as cyberbullying or online harassment in the 
states that have enacted anti-cyberbullying statutes, as well as 
defamation.275 It also would not protect a student’s off-campus 
cyberspeech that is designed to disrupt the orderly learning environment 
in the event the student intentionally mutates off-campus speech into on-
campus speech either through her own actions or through the actions of 
another.  
Third, this statutory framework provides an avenue for students and 
their parents to bring a substantive claim in state courts or federal courts 
other than a violation of the child’s First Amendment right to free speech 
or a corresponding provision in a state constitution. 
Federal courts have provided a roadmap for legislators to draft statutes 
that can better protect students’ right to free speech than the First 
Amendment in the off-campus cyberspeech context.276 In Blue Mountain 
and Central York, the Third Circuit and the District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania respectively reasoned how a school violated a 
Pennsylvania statute that broadly protected a student’s right to free 
speech, and how a school did not violate a Pennsylvania regulatory code 
because it tracked Tinker’s language, thus granting no more free speech 
protection to the student than Tinker’s test.277 The proposed statutory 
language is broad in that it grants free speech protection to all students’ 
off-campus cyberspeech, except under three narrow circumstances. The 
proposed statute can also be broadened to protect all student off-campus 
speech. In addition, this proposed language expressly departs from 
Tinker’s language and lower federal courts’ interpretation of Tinker’s 
language.  
By enacting a similar statutory framework or language that provides 
greater free speech protections for off-campus cyberspeech, state 
legislatures will again perform their noble service as laboratories of 
democracy by protecting students’ right to free speech beyond that which 
is currently granted by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
With the Supreme Court silent on whether Tinker’s substantial-
disruption test is applicable to students’ off-campus cyberspeech, circuit 
courts creatively fashioned different standards to trigger Tinker’s test. 
                                                                                                                     
 275. For thorough discussion about cyberbullying statutes and First Amendment issues 
associated with those statutes, see Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 236, at 693. 
 276. See supra Section II.B. 
 277. See supra Section II.B. 
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District courts adhere to circuit courts’ binding precedent, but if a circuit 
had not decided what standard to apply, the district courts in those circuits 
applied the standard or standards the district courts found most 
persuasive. State courts, on the other hand, play virtually no role in 
students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases, but federal courts have hinted at 
ways state law can provide new avenues to protect students’ right to free 
speech.  
This Note has proposed new federal and state approaches for off-
campus cyberspeech cases. Federal courts could apply more stringent 
standards to trigger Tinker’s test or scrap Tinker’s test altogether in the 
off-campus cyberspeech context. But if the federal courts continue on 
their current course, state legislatures can enact statutes or regulations 
that supersede Tinker by providing parents the opportunity to file civil 
actions in state court. This Note’s proposed statutory framework can 
provide for a state action addressing violations of a student’s right to free 
speech if and when school administrations punish a student for her off-
campus cyberspeech, unless that cyberspeech was threatening, unlawful, 
or mutated into on-campus speech. 
With students’ increasing usage of cyberspeech both on- and off-
campus, students should be just as worried that their constitutional right 
to free speech will be shed when they exit the schoolhouse gate as when 
they enter it. This Note proposes new federal and state approaches 
designed to digitize the schoolhouse gate for the twenty-first century and 
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